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I. Introduction
As the number of unmanned systems to support military operations has pro-liferated over the past decade, so too have the legal issues associated with
their use in conventional warfare and the “war on terrorism.” Between 2000 and
2008, the number of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the US Department of De-
fense (DoD) inventory jumped from under fifty to over six thousand.1 By March
2010, the number had increased to over seven thousand.2 In fiscal year 2009, UAS
conducted over 450,000 flight hours; the number of hours in 2010 was expected to
exceed 550,000.3 To support this increasing reliance on unmanned systems, the Air
Force is expanding the number of UAS pilots and air operations staffers from 450 to
1,100 by 2012.4 In 2009, the Air Force trained more UAS pilots than fighter pilots.5
Today, unmanned systems are being used across the entire spectrum of opera-
tions, from their traditional role of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) to an emerging role of offensive strike operations. UAS have clearly become
the weapon of choice to target terrorists and other militants in isolated locations
within Pakistan and Yemen. In 2007, for example, there were only 5 UAS attacks in
Pakistan.6 The number of aerial attacks increased to 36 in 2008, and during the
first year of the Obama administration the number jumped to 53.7 During the first
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four months of 2010, UAS have conducted 60 attacks in Pakistan.8 If the current
pace continues, the number of UAS attacks could well exceed 150 in 2010.
The importance of the relationship between the use of unmanned systems and
the law is not lost on our military and civilian leaders. At a session on unmanned
naval technologies at the Brookings Institution in November 2009, the Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, acknowledged that “as unmanned
systems become ubiquitous on the modern battlefield in everything from targeting
to disrupting the flow of enemy information . . . , there are going to be legal issues
that come up and issues related to the law of war.”9 Four months later, the State De-
partment Legal Adviser, Harold Koh, defended the Obama administration’s use of
UAS to engage terrorist targets in Pakistan and elsewhere, indicating that “U.S. tar-
geting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war.”10
Not everyone agrees, however, that the use of unmanned systems to attack ter-
rorist targets outside traditional “combat zones,” like Afghanistan and Iraq, is con-
sistent with international and domestic law. Some of the criticisms that will be
examined in this paper include:
• The United States is not engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda or any
other militant group. Terrorist attacks are criminal acts that must be addressed
with law enforcement measures, not armed attacks that give rise to the use of mili-
tary force in self-defense. The use of force in this context is governed by interna-
tional human rights law (IHRL), not international humanitarian law (IHL).
Because armed drones are warfighting, not law enforcement, tools, they may not
be used to strike terrorist targets outside the combat zone.
• Targeting individual terrorist leaders constitutes an unlawful extrajudicial
killing in violation of IHRL, as well as the ban on assassination under Executive
Order (E.O.) 12333.
• Conducting UAS strikes against terrorist targets within the territory of an-
other nation without the consent of that nation violates Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter, which restricts nations from using force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State.
• Even if the right of self-defense applies, the use of UAS to attack terrorist tar-
gets outside Afghanistan and Iraq violates the IHL principles of military necessity,
proportionality and distinction.
• If the United States is engaged in an armed conflict, civilian UAS operators
(e.g., Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives) are unlawful combatants and
may not participate in hostilities. Only lawful combatants have a right to use force
during an armed conflict.
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• UAS strikes may only be conducted against civilians who have taken a direct
part in hostilities. Although acts of terrorism may cause harm, most do not meet
the criteria for direct participation in hostilities (DPH). State responses to these
acts must conform to the lethal force standards applicable to self-defense and law
enforcement.
• The use of advanced weapons systems in lethal operations against terrorists
is illegal under international law.
II. Armed Attack or Threat of Attack by Non-State Actors and the
Right of Self-Defense
Opponents to the use of drones outside of Afghanistan and Iraq argue that the “war
on terrorism” is a myth because al-Qaeda’s actions and US responses thereto “have
been too sporadic and low-intensity to qualify as armed conflict.”11 They cite Pros-
ecutor v. Tadic; and Additional Protocol II (AP II) to support their position. In
Tadic;, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia determined
that an “armed conflict exists wherever there is a resort to armed force between
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and orga-
nized armed groups or between such groups within a state.”12 AP II similarly pro-
vides that armed conflicts do not include “situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature.”13 These opponents further argue that an armed military response
to a terrorist attack will almost never meet the requirements for the lawful exercise
of self-defense, because “terrorist attacks are generally treated as criminal acts . . . ,
not armed attacks that can give rise to the right of self-defense.”14 They additionally
argue that the use of military force “long after the terror act . . . loses its defensive
character and becomes unlawful reprisal.”15
These arguments are incorrect as a matter of law and are clearly not supported
by State practice. Foremost, they ignore the fact that more innocent victims have
died at the hands of terrorists since 9/11 than on the battlefields of Afghanistan
and Iraq combined. These numbers do not include the thousands of innocent civil-
ians killed by al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other militant groups in Afghanistan and
Iraq since 2002. These figures also do not take into account the fact that the num-
ber of deaths and injuries would have been much higher had several planned ter-
rorist attacks been successful. To argue that al-Qaeda’s actions have been too
sporadic and low-intensity to qualify as an armed conflict is disingenuous, at best.
Al-Qaeda operatives have attacked US embassies and consulates, US naval vessels,
US military bases, the Pentagon and the US financial center in New York. With
operations in over sixty countries, al-Qaeda has trained, equipped and supported
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a potent armed force that continues to plan and execute attacks against the United
States and its interests worldwide on a scale that requires a proportionate military
response. Despite coalition successes in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world,
al-Qaeda continues to pose a significant and imminent threat to the United States
and its allies. In short, the armed conflict against the organization and its affiliates
is far from over.
The opponents’ arguments likewise disregard the fact that the law regarding
armed attacks by non-State actors and the application of IHL (i.e., the law of armed
conflict (LOAC)) to these armed groups have evolved dramatically since the mid-
1990s, particularly after 9/11. Based on actions taken by the UN Security Council,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization of American
States (OAS) after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it is now well recognized that non-
State actors can engage in an armed attack that gives rise to the right of national and
collective self-defense.
A. Armed Attacks by Non-State Actors
On September 11, 2001, terrorists associated with al-Qaeda crashed two commer-
cial jets into the twin towers of the World Trade Center (WTC), another jet into the
Pentagon and a fourth in a field in rural Pennsylvania. Nearly three thousand peo-
ple, mostly civilians, were killed and thousands of others were injured.
Immediately following these brutal and unprovoked attacks, the Security Coun-
cil determined that al-Qaeda, a non-State actor, had conducted an armed attack
against the United States, giving rise to the right of individual and collective self-
defense under Article 51 of the Charter.16 Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001)
further determined that the 9/11 attack, “like any act of international terrorism,”
was a “threat to international peace and security” and expressed a readiness “to
take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of . . . [9/11], and to com-
bat all forms of terrorism.”17
NATO soon followed suit, invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the
first time in its history. Article 5 provides that if a NATO ally is the victim of “an
armed attack,” each and every member of the alliance will consider that act as an
armed attack against all members and will take actions they deem necessary in
collective self-defense to assist the ally that has been attacked (emphasis
added).18 A few weeks later, recalling the inherent right of individual and collec-
tive self-defense, the OAS adopted a resolution on September 21 acknowledging
that the 9/11 attack against the United States was an attack “against all American
states and that in accordance with [Article 3 of] . . . the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) . . . , all States Parties . . . shall provide effective
reciprocal assistance to address such attacks and the threat of any similar attacks
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against any American state . . . .”19 The resolution further decided that “the States
Parties shall render additional assistance and support to the United States and to
each other . . . to address the September 11 attacks, and also to prevent future ter-
rorist acts”20 (emphasis added).
Domestically, the US Congress responded by adopting a joint resolution—Au-
thorization to Use Military Force (AUMF)—that authorized the President “to use
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order
to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons”21 (emphases added). The US Supreme Court
subsequently “recognized the AUMF as the functional equivalent of a declaration
of war” in the Hamdi and Hamdan decisions and the 2010 National Security Strat-
egy continues to reflect the view that the United States is “at war with . . . al-Qa’ida,
and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies,
and partners.”22
Based on these international and domestic authorities, the United States com-
menced military operations in self-defense against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Af-
ghanistan on October 7, 2001. Of note, military operations against non-State
actors are consistent with prior US practice. Throughout its history, the United
States has engaged in a number of armed conflicts with groups that it has not rec-
ognized as sovereign nations in such conflicts as the US Civil War, Indian wars,
Philippine Insurrection and Vietnam War (Viet Cong).23 The question today is
whether these historical precedents and the 2001 authorities remain viable in 2010,
and whether they (along with the inherent right of self-defense) can be extended to
apply to terrorist forces that continue to plan and conduct acts of aggression
against the United States and its allies outside the borders of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Clearly, the answer to both of these questions is yes. Following 9/11, the Secu-
rity Council, NATO and OAS all determined that the United States had been “at-
tacked” by al-Qaeda, giving rise to the right of national and collective self-defense.
These determinations are consistent with the plain language of Article 51 of the
UN Charter, which simply refers to armed attacks against a member State (i.e.,
“nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” (emphasis
added)). The Charter does not require that the attack be conducted by a nation-
State. Moreover, none of these organizations placed temporal or geographic re-
strictions on the use of force in self-defense. On the contrary, the opposite is true.
Resolution 1368 specifically decided that “any act of international terrorism [is] . . .
a threat to international peace and security” (emphasis added). Moreover, the
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resolution expressed a readiness “to take all necessary steps . . . to combat all forms
of terrorism,” not just the 9/11 attack (emphasis added). The OAS resolution simi-
larly provided that the States parties would provide assistance and support to the
United States to address the 9/11 attacks, as well as “the threat of any similar attacks
against any American state . . . to prevent future terrorist acts” (emphases added).
And while NATO simply decided that all member States should take the actions
they deemed necessary to assist the United States following the 9/11 attacks, it did
not limit that assistance to a particular country or military operation. Likewise, al-
though the AUMF adopted by Congress focuses on the nations, organizations or
persons that planned, authorized, committed or aided the 9/11 attacks (or har-
bored such organizations or persons), the law does not place any temporal or geo-
graphic restrictions on the use of force. It simply provides that the President can
use all necessary and appropriate force against those responsible for the 9/11 at-
tacks “in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons” (emphasis added).
Despite the use-of-force measures authorized by these international and re-
gional organizations, as well as the US Congress, opponents to the use of drones to
attack terrorists outside of Afghanistan and Iraq nevertheless argue that these
authorities are dated and that use of force based on continued reliance on these
authorities has lost its defensive character and amounts to unlawful reprisals. As-
suming for the sake of argument that the opponents are correct in saying that the
United States is not at war with al-Qaeda and that the 2001 authorities have some-
how lapsed, that does not end the debate. The inherent right of self-defense still
provides an adequate legal basis to use lethal force against terrorist targets in Paki-
stan and elsewhere that demonstrate a continuing and imminent threat of armed
attack against the United States and its interests.
B. The Inherent Right of Self-Defense
Customary international law, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, recognizes
that all nations enjoy an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.
Included within this right is the right of anticipatory self-defense—the right of a
nation to protect itself from an imminent attack where peaceful means are not rea-
sonably available to prevent the attack.24 Clearly, it would be inconsistent with the
purposes of the Charter if a nation was required to absorb a first strike, e.g., another
9/11 or a weapon of mass destruction attack, before taking necessary and propor-
tionate military measures to prevent an imminent attack by an armed aggressor. In
this context, “imminent” does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.
As indicated in the 2006 US National Security Strategy:
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[T]he first duty of the United States Government remains what it always has been: to
protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring American prin-
ciple that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all
elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage. The greater the
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy’s attack. . . .
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. The United
States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is
that nonmilitary actions succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pre-
text for aggression.25
The determination of whether an attack is imminent is therefore based on an as-
sessment of all facts and circumstances known at the time—real-time intelligence,
heightened political tensions, previous and current threats by the aggressor, pat-
tern of aggression/attacks, stated intentions of the aggressor, etc.
The pivotal question today is whether the ongoing activities of al-Qaeda and its
supporters continue to pose an imminent threat to the United States and its allies
that would justify the use of armed force in self-defense to preempt future attacks
against US interests at home and abroad. If one examines past and current acts of
aggression committed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates against the United States and
its allies, the answer to that question is clearly yes.
Since the first attack on the WTC in 1993, there have been over seventy major
terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies that have resulted in the
deaths of over five thousand people, most of whom were innocent civilians.26
These deaths exceed the total number of US soldiers killed in action in Afghanistan
and Iraq since the beginnings of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Iraqi Freedom.27 Over sixty of these incidents have occurred since 9/11, resulting in
over sixteen hundred deaths and thousands of others injured. These numbers
would be much higher if you count the thousands of innocent civilians that have
been killed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Iraq and Afghanistan or had several
planned attacks—such as the December 1999 plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport,
the December 2001 failed “shoe bomber” attack, the foiled attack on a British air-
liner in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, the August 2006 plot to blow up ten planes
bound for the United States, the June 2007 failed car bombings in London, the De-
cember 2009 failed “underwear bomber” attack and the May 2010 failed bombing
in Times Square—been successful.
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It is clear from these incidents that al-Qaeda continues to pose an imminent
threat to the United States and its allies and continues to threaten large-scale at-
tacks against the United States and US interests. For instance, in November 2008,
a former senior Yemeni al-Qaeda operative told the London-based Al-Quds Al-
Arabi newspaper that Osama bin Laden was planning an attack against the United
States that would outdo 9/11 and that al-Qaeda was reinforcing “training camps
around the world that will lead the next wave of action against the West.”28 In June
2009, Al-Jazeera television broadcast a message from bin Laden that threatened
Americans with revenge for supporting Pakistan’s military offensive to expel the
Taliban from Swat Valley.29 Six months later, a Nigerian man (Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, the “underwear bomber”) with links to al-Qaeda attempted to
ignite an explosive device on board a Northwest Airlines flight with 278 passengers
on board as the plane prepared to land in Detroit on Christmas day.30 Fortunately,
the device failed to ignite, but bin Laden nevertheless claimed responsibility for
the attempted bombing.31 In January 2010, the US embassy in Yemen was closed
in response to ongoing threats by al-Qaeda.32 An attack on the embassy in 2008
had killed nineteen, including an eighteen-year-old American woman.33 In March
2010, Al-Jazeera aired a tape in which bin Laden threatened to kill any American
captured by al-Qaeda if the United States executed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attack.34
In early May 2010, a naturalized US citizen from Pakistan, Faisal Shahzad,
unsuccessfully attempted to ignite a car bomb that contained gasoline, propane,
fertilizer and fireworks in Times Square.35 According to Attorney General Holder,
it was “clear that this was a terrorist plot aimed at murdering Americans in one of
the busiest places in the country.”36 Shahzad was arrested by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation on May 4. During his interrogation, he admitted his role in the at-
tempted attack and that he had received explosives training in Pakistan during a
then-recent visit.37 On June 21, Shahzad pled guilty to ten criminal counts, includ-
ing the attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, and indicated that until the
United States “stops the occupation of Muslim lands and stops killing the Mus-
lims . . . we will be attacking [the] U.S.”38 The Pakistani Taliban immediately took
credit for the attack and there is now evidence that the group was intimately in-
volved in the failed attack.39 Several additional suspects have been arrested in Paki-
stan, including an executive (Salman Ashraf Khan) of a catering company that
routinely organizes events for the US embassy, and three Pakistanis were taken into
custody in the United States for their suspected roles in the attack.40
In mid-May, Indonesian police foiled an al-Qaeda plot to assassinate President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and other senior government officials at the upcom-
ing Independence Day (August 17) celebrations in Jakarta. The plan also included
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attacking hotels and killing foreigners—in particular, Americans. In addition to
arresting a large number of suspected militants at an al-Qaeda training camp in
Aceh, the Indonesian police also seized a large number of assault rifles, thousands
of rounds of ammunition and jihadist literature.41
And on May 17, 2010, Iraqi security forces announced they had arrested a
known al-Qaeda militant, Abdullah Azam Saleh al-Qahtani, who was planning an
attack at the World Cup in South Africa and on June 26, 2010, a Pakistani suspect
in the 2008 Mumbai attacks was arrested in Zimbabwe when he tried to cross into
South Africa with a false Kenyan passport.42 Finally, on July 11, 2010, the Somali
insurgent group al-Shabab, which has ties to al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility for a
coordinated attack that killed more than seventy people, including a number of
foreigners (one was an American), that were watching the final match of the World
Cup on outdoor screens in Kampala, Uganda.43
In discussing the ongoing terrorist threat against the United States and its allies,
Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell told Congress in November
2008 that al-Qaeda was “improving the last key aspect of its ability to attack the US:
the identification, training and positioning of operatives [i.e., Western recruits, in-
cluding American citizens] for an attack on the homeland.”44 According to a study
by the New America Foundation, “between 100 and 150 Westerners are believed to
have traveled to the [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] FATA in 2009” to train
with Taliban militants.45 Arguably, these new recruits will be able to move around
the United States and Europe more easily and be more difficult to detect than tradi-
tional foreign operatives.
There is also growing evidence that al-Qaeda’s anti-American/anti-Western
ideology has been adopted by a number of Islamist extremist groups in Europe and
North America.46 A Pennsylvania woman (Colleen LaRose, a.k.a. Jihad Jane), for
example, was indicted in March 2010 for “conspiracy to provide material support
to terrorists and kill a person in a foreign country.”47 LaRose conspired with five
unnamed coconspirators to, inter alia, recruit “men online to wage violent jihad in
South Asia and Europe . . . [and] women online who had passports and the ability to
travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad.”48 According to the indict-
ment, LaRose believed that “her physical appearance would allow her to blend in
with many people.”49 A second US citizen, Jamie Paulin Ramirez, was indicted in
April 2010 for her involvement in the conspiracy with Jihad Jane.50 Irish police
have since arrested seven additional individuals involved in the conspiracy.51
In June 2010, a federal grand jury in Houston indicted Barry Walter Bujol, a US
citizen from Hempstead, Texas, for attempting to provide material support to al-
Qaeda, including personnel, money, prepaid phone cards, SIM cards, global posi-
tioning systems, cell phones and restricted publications on the effects of US
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military weapons (e.g., UAS) in Afghanistan.52 On the same day, an Ohio couple
from Toledo, Hor I. and Amera A. Aki, dual US-Lebanese citizens, were arrested
for conspiring to provide material support to Hezbollah.53 And on June 5, 2010,
two New Jersey men (Mohamed Mahmood Alessa and Carlos Eduardo Almonte)
were arrested at Kennedy International Airport as they attempted to board sepa-
rate planes for Somalia. The two men intended to join al-Shabab and receive train-
ing in Somalia in order to kill American troops.54 Finally, to further illustrate the
ability of al-Qaeda to recruit and direct terrorist operations in the West, on July 8,
2010, Norwegian officials announced the arrest of three al-Qaeda operatives for
their roles in plotting a foiled 2009 New York subway attack and planning to blow
up a shopping center in Manchester, England.55
In response to continuing al-Qaeda activities and threats aimed at US interests
at home and abroad, President Obama indicated in November 2009 that terrorist
networks like al-Qaeda remained the greatest threat to US security.56 Similarly,
Secretary of State Clinton stated in February 2010 that the greatest threat to the
United States was transnational non-State terrorist networks like al-Qaeda, com-
menting that al-Qaeda was a “very committed, clever, diabolical group of terrorists
who are always looking for weaknesses and openings.”57 On March 9, 2010, the
US Maritime Administration issued an advisory that warned ships transiting the
Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden along the coast of Yemen that
al-Qaeda remains interested in maritime attacks in these waters and that the
attacks could be similar in nature to the attack against the USS Cole (2000) or the
M/V Limberg (2002), “where a small to mid-size boat laden with explosives was
detonated in the vicinity of the targeted ships.”58 The advisory further indicated,
however, that “it cannot be ruled out that the extremists may be capable of other[,]
more sophisticated methods of targeting, such as the use of missile[s] or projectiles
to target ship[s] such as the mortars used to target a Navy ship in Jordan in
2005.” Finally, a May 2010 Department of Homeland Security memo indicates
that “the number and pace of attempted [terrorist] attacks against the United
States over the past nine months have surpassed the number of attempts during
any other previous one-year period” and that terrorists will attempt to conduct
strikes within the United States with “increased frequency” and with “little or no
warning.”59
In short, despite the substantial progress that has been made toward eliminating
the threat posed by terrorists, al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain a potent and deter-
mined force with the capability and intent to strike the US mainland, its allies and
US interests abroad at every opportunity with the most destructive means at their
disposal. The militant groups continue to train and equip their fighting forces in
order to plan and execute devastating attacks against the United States and its allies
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around the world. Under these circumstances, international law allows the United
States to preemptively use proportionate force in self-defense to eliminate the con-
tinuing and imminent threat posed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.
Whether one agreed or disagreed with the former Bush administration’s initiatives
following 9/11, the President’s statement in 2004 regarding the war on terror can-
not be ignored:
The war on terror is not a figure of speech. It is an inescapable calling of our generation.
. . . There can be no separate peace with the terrorist enemy. Any sign of weakness or re-
treat simply validates terrorist violence and invites more violence for all nations. The
only certain way to protect our people is by early, united, and decisive action.60
Until the threat is effectively eliminated, the United States can continue to use
force in self-defense against al-Qaeda and its supporters, to include the use of un-
manned systems.
Despite disagreements with some of the Bush administration’s policies with re-
gard to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration appears to
have adopted the Bush approach to the use of drones in Pakistan and elsewhere.
On March 24, 2010, Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh delivered the
keynote speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law (ASIL). In part, Mr. Koh discussed the strategic vision of international law that
the Obama administration was attempting to implement, what he called “The Law
of 9/11: detentions, use of force, and prosecution.”61 In defending US targeting of
terrorists in Pakistan and elsewhere, Mr. Koh indicated that, as a matter of interna-
tional law, the United States is engaged in an “armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well
as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and
may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international
law.”62 Mr. Koh further emphasized that al-Qaeda continues to pose an imminent
threat to the United States: “[A]l-Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the
United States, and indeed continues to attack us.”63 Accordingly, he continued,
“the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility
to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by tar-
geting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks.”64
III. Lawful Targeting of Belligerents v. Extrajudicial Killings/Assassination
Opponents to the use of drones argue that IHRL is the governing body of law that
must be applied when using deadly force against terrorists outside the traditional
combat zone. They further argue that IHRL prohibits extrajudicial killing. Under
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an IHRL/law enforcement construct, deadly force should only be used as a last re-
sort to save lives and only after lesser means have failed. Accordingly, before using
deadly force, an attempt should be made to capture the terrorist or allow him/her
an opportunity to surrender. They argue that the use of UAS to target terrorists in
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere violates the IHRL prohibition on extraju-
dicial killing, as well as the US ban on assassination in E.O. 12333.
These arguments incorrectly assume that the United States is not engaged in an
armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the targeted terrorist groups do not pose an
imminent and continuing threat to the United States, either of which gives rise to
the inherent right of self-defense. In short, nothing in E.O. 12333 or IHL/LOAC
restricts the lawful use of force in self-defense against an enemy belligerent (privi-
leged or unprivileged) or against a group that poses an imminent or continuing
threat to the United States and its interests.
A. The Assassination Ban under E.O. 12333
Assassination of foreign nationals has been prohibited as a matter of US domestic
policy since 1976 when President Ford signed E.O. 11905. Section 5(g) provides
that “no employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire
to engage in, political assassination.”65 The reference to “political” assassination
was dropped by the Carter administration in E.O. 12036, opting instead to generi-
cally prohibit “assassination.”66 An identical prohibition is found in section 2.11 of
E.O. 12333.67 Although “assassination” is not defined in the executive orders, the
term involves the intentional killing (or murder) of a targeted individual commit-
ted for political purposes.68 The purpose of E.O. 12333 is, therefore, to prevent the
killing of foreign public officials for political purposes. It does not, however, limit
the lawful use of force in self-defense against terrorists or other groups that pose
an imminent or continuing threat to the security of the United States and its citi-
zens.69
It is widely recognized that enemy belligerents—whether members of the armed
forces of a State or civilians and non-State actors directly participating in hostili-
ties—may be lawfully targeted and killed at all times, subject to the IHL principles
of military necessity and proportionality.70 Therefore, the ambush by US aircraft
and downing of the Japanese aircraft, over Bougainville, on April 18, 1943, carrying
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese commander of the Pearl Harbor attack,
was not considered an assassination, but rather a lawful attack on an individual
combatant—a legitimate military target.71 Likewise, President Reagan’s authoriza-
tion to attack Moammar Gadhafi’s home in Libya following the 1986 Berlin disco-
theque bombing that killed an American service member and injured 230 others
was not considered a violation of the executive order’s ban on assassination,
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because Gadhafi was a legitimate military target.72 During the first Gulf War
(1991), coalition aircraft targeted 580 command and control targets, including 260
leadership targets (e.g., Saddam Hussein’s palaces and places that he frequented).73
These attacks were not considered as violations of the assassination ban. Similarly,
President Clinton authorized missile attacks against the Iraqi Intelligence Service
(the Mukhabarat) headquarters on June 26, 1993 after he was informed that
Kuwaiti forces had foiled an Iraqi-sponsored assassination attempt against former
President George H.W. Bush.74
Five years later, President Clinton again authorized cruise missile strikes, on this
occasion against a chemical plant in Sudan and al-Qaeda training camps in Af-
ghanistan after terrorists bombed the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing
224 people and injuring over 4,500 others.75 None of the strikes authorized by
President Clinton were considered violations of E.O. 12333. Finally, following
9/11, the Bush administration concluded that the assassination ban did not prevent
the United States from targeting terrorist leadership and command and control
capabilities in self-defense.76 This determination was later used to justify the 2002
targeted killing of Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a senior al-Qaeda leader, in Yemen
by a CIA drone.77
Similarly, since 9/11, it is equally clear that under UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1368 (2001) a State may use force in self-defense against acts of aggression by
terrorist groups. It is also clear under customary international law and Article 51 of
the Charter that a nation may use force in self-defense against the imminent or
continuing threat of attack by these groups. Therefore, killing al-Qaeda members
and other militants who are engaged in ongoing acts of violence against the United
States and its allies, and who have the capabilities and stated intentions to continue
to conduct such attacks in the future, is an act of self-defense, not murder, hence
not assassination.
Based on the increased number of drone attacks authorized by President
Obama against suspected terrorist targets in Pakistan’s FATA, it appears that the
Obama administration has taken a similar approach to that of its predecessor.78
The administration’s position on the issue of assassination was clearly articulated
by the State Department Legal Adviser at the ASIL meeting. During his keynote ad-
dress, Mr. Koh stated that
individuals who are part of . . . an [enemy] armed group are belligerents and, therefore,
lawful targets under international law. . . .
[A] state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not re-
quired to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force. . . .
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[U]nder domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—consistent with the appli-
cable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders
when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does
not constitute “assassination.”79
B. Extrajudicial Killing under International Law
1. Reports and Correspondence of the Special Rapporteur to the UN Human
Rights Council
In January 2003, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions (hereinafter Special Rapporteur) submitted a report to the UN Human
Rights Council indicating that a November 2002 UAS strike that killed six al-
Qaeda militants in Yemen was a “clear case of extrajudicial killing.”80 Despite find-
ing that (1) the government of Yemen had approved the attack; (2) the militants
(including a senior al-Qaeda official, Abu Ali al-Harithi) had been involved in the
attacks on the Cole and the French oil tanker Limburg; (3) prior attempts to appre-
hend the suspects had been unsuccessful; and (4) “governments have a responsibil-
ity to protect their citizens against the excesses of non-State actors or other
authorities” the Special Rapporteur determined that the actions by the United
States and Yemen violated IHRL and IHL.81
In August 2005, a new Special Rapporteur (Philip Alston) sent a letter to the US
government requesting information on the use of UAS to target and kill Haitham
al-Yemeni, a senior al-Qaeda figure, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border on May
10, 2005. The Special Rapporteur reiterated the view that questions of IHL fall
squarely within his mandate and that “efforts to eradicate terrorism must be un-
dertaken within a framework” governed by IHRL, as well as IHL.82 Dissatisfied
with the US response to the August letter, the Special Rapporteur submitted a re-
port to the Human Rights Council in May 2009 alleging that the United States is
using drones to engage in targeted killings on the territory of other States and that
these attacks have caused a number of civilian casualties. Mr. Alston additionally
alleged that the United States had been evasive in responding to his questions re-
garding the legal basis for its targeting decisions and urged the Obama administra-
tion to reconsider the previous administration’s “positions and move to ensure the
necessary transparency and accountability” for its drone program.83 Having failed
to receive a response from the new administration, Mr. Alston took his case to the
“court of public opinion.” In October 2009, he reiterated his position in a New
York Times article stating that “the United States must demonstrate that it is not
randomly killing people in violation of international law through its use of drones
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on the Afghan border” and that the US refusal to respond to UN “concerns that the
use of drones might result in illegal executions was an ‘untenable’ position.”84
2. US Responses to the Special Rapporteur
The United States responded to the January 2003 al-Harithi report on April 14 of
that year, indicating that “inquiries related to allegations stemming from any mili-
tary operation conducted during the course of an armed conflict . . . [did] not fall
within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur” and that the United States dis-
agreed with his conclusion that “military operations against enemy combatants
could be regarded as extrajudicial executions by consent of Governments.”85 In
support of its position, the United States pointed out that military operations con-
ducted by a government against legitimate military targets like al-Qaeda were gov-
erned by IHL/LOAC, which allows enemy combatants to be attacked unless they
have surrendered or are otherwise rendered hors de combat. The US response fur-
ther emphasized that the United States was at war with al-Qaeda and related ter-
rorist networks and that, despite coalition successes around the world, the war was
far from over. With operations in more than sixty countries, al-Qaeda had effec-
tively trained, equipped and supported armed forces that have planned and exe-
cuted attacks worldwide against the United States “on a scale that far exceeds
criminal activity.”86 More important, al-Qaeda terrorists continued to plan addi-
tional attacks against the United States and its allies and were, therefore, subject to
armed attack by US forces. In conclusion, the United States stressed that the mili-
tary operations conducted against the United States and its nationals by al-Qaeda
both before and after 9/11 “necessitate a military response by the armed forces of
the United States”; to conclude otherwise would “permit an armed group to wage
war unlawfully against a sovereign state while precluding that state from defend-
ing itself.”87
The United States submitted a similar response to the Special Rapporteur’s letter
requesting information regarding the killing of Haitham al-Yemeni on the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border in May 2005. Recalling its April 2003 letter, the United States
reemphasized that legitimate military operations conducted by a government dur-
ing an armed conflict do not fall within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur and
that the conduct of such operations is governed by IHL/LOAC. For the reasons
previously stated in 2003, the United States reiterated that it was engaged in a con-
tinuing armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the military operations conducted
and planned against the United States and its nationals by the terrorist organiza-
tion both before and after 9/11 necessitated a military response. The US response
then went on to rebut the Special Rapporteur’s position that his mandate included
issues arising under IHL/LOAC. In response to the Special Rapporteur’s assertion
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that all major Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly resolutions in re-
cent years referred explicitly to IHL, the United States pointed out that the mention
of IHL in these resolutions is in the context of suggestions or admonitions to gov-
ernments and “does not . . . impart upon the Special Rapporteur a mandate to con-
sider issues arising under” IHL/LOAC.88 The US response similarly rejected the
Special Rapporteur’s argument that General Assembly Resolution 59/197 (2004)
urged governments to take all necessary and possible measures, in conformity with
IHRL and IHL, to prevent loss of life during armed conflicts. The United States
pointed out that the Resolution did not expand or modify the mandate of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur, but rather urged governments to take action, while directing the
Special Rapporteur to continue to operate within his mandate. Finally, in response
to the Special Rapporteur’s assertion that “every single annual report of the Special
Rapporteur since at least 1992 has dealt with violations of the right to life in the
context of international and non-international armed conflicts,” the United States
noted that “while the Special Rapporteur may have reported on cases outside of his
mandate, this does not give” him the competence to address such issues.89
Regarding the scope of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate, it is also important
to note that nothing in Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1982/29, which
appointed the first Special Rapporteur to examine the questions related to sum-
mary or arbitrary executions, empowers the Special Rapporteur to consider mat-
ters involving armed conflict or IHL.90 Similarly, nothing in General Assembly
Resolution 60/251, which created the Human Rights Council as the replacement
for the Commission on Human Rights, grants the Council competence over mat-
ters regarding IHL in general, or armed conflict in particular.91 Moreover, the
Council is established as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly; matters af-
fecting international peace and security, aggression and the use of force in self-
defense are under the cognizance of the Security Council, not the General
Assembly.
3. Obama Administration’s Position
As evidenced by the Koh speech, the current administration’s position on the legal-
ity of using UAS to target al-Qaeda operatives in areas like the FATA parallels that
of the previous administration:
[I]n all of our operations involving the use of force, including those in the armed con-
flict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, the Obama Administration is
committed . . . to conducting ourselves in accordance with all applicable law. With re-
spect to the subject of targeting, . . . it is the considered view of this Administration—and
it has certainly been my experience during my time as Legal Adviser—that US targeting
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practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles,
comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war. . . .
[A]s a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-
Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 at-
tacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under inter-
national law. As a matter of domestic law, Congress authorized the use of all necessary
and appropriate force through the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF). These domestic and international legal authorities continue to this day. . . .
[A]l-Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed
continues to attack us. Thus, in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the
authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force,
including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level
al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks. . . . [T]his is a conflict with an organized ter-
rorist enemy that … plans and executes its attacks against us and our allies while hiding
among civilian populations. That behavior . . . makes the application of international
law more difficult and more critical for the protection of innocent civilians. . . . [T]his
Administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure
that these operations are conducted consistently with law of war principles, includ-
ing . . . the principle of distinction . . . and . . . the principle of proportionality. . . . In U.S.
operations against al-Qaeda and its associated forces—including lethal operations
conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles—great care is taken to adhere to
these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objec-
tives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum. . . .
[I]ndividuals who are part of such an armed group are belligerents and, therefore, law-
ful targets under international law. . . . [S]ome have argued that the use of lethal force
against specific individuals fails to provide adequate process and thus constitutes un-
lawful extrajudicial killing. But a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legiti-
mate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state
may use lethal force. . . . [S]ome have [also] argued that our targeting practices violate
domestic law, in particular, the long-standing domestic ban on assassinations. But under
domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—consistent with the applicable laws
of war—for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in
self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute
“assassination.”92
C. Application of IHL v. IHRL in the War on Terrorism
As discussed above, human rights advocates argue that targeting decisions in the
war on terrorism are governed by both IHL and IHRL. The US government, on the
other hand, has correctly taken the position that the targeting of enemy
belligerents, including al-Qaeda terrorists outside the traditional combat zone,
is governed solely by IHL. In short, enemy belligerents, whether members of the
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armed forces of a nation, terrorists or other civilians directly participating in
hostilities, do not enjoy a “right to life” during an armed conflict, irrespective of
their location.
1. Are IHL and IHRL Complementary Regimes?
Proponents of the assassination/extrajudicial killing argument take the position
that al-Qaeda terrorists are criminals to whom law enforcement rules and IHRL,
not major military force and IHL, apply. Military force, they argue, may only be
used in self-defense or as authorized by the UN Security Council. They argue that
outside of these situations, States may only use law enforcement measures to com-
bat terrorists,93 and that drones are warfighting weapons, not law enforcement
tools, and may, therefore, not be used to target terrorists outside the traditional
combat zone.94 Rather, law enforcement rules, such as the UN Basic Principles on
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (UN Basic Princi-
ples), govern when police can use force against civilians, including terrorists. They
include such provisions as:
4. Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply
non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use
force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of
achieving the intended result.
. . .
9. Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-
defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to
prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to
arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his
or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these ob-
jectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly
unavoidable in order to protect life.95
The proponents of IHRL applicability to the targeting of terrorists also cite the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Nuclear Weapons and Wall advisory opinions
to support their position. In discussing the right to life in paragraph 25 of the
Nuclear Weapons opinion, the ICJ stated that
[t]he protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not
cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the
right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be
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deprived of [one’s] life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary depri-
vation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis,
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct
of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon
in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the
Covenant can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and
not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.96
Similarly, in the Wall opinion, the Court indicated in paragraph 106 that
the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed
conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the re-
lationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are
thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international
humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others
may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the
question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humani-
tarian law.97
2. Targeting of Enemy Belligerents Is Governed by IHL
Arguments advanced by proponents of the complementary IHL/IHRL model are
misplaced from both a practical and a legal point of view. Human rights advocates
would argue that US forces must first attempt to capture a suspected terrorist or
provide him/her an opportunity to surrender before using lethal force.98 From a
practical perspective, such a suggestion borders on the ridiculous. These terrorists
are hiding and operating in camps and strongholds located in some of the most
remote and inaccessible areas in the world—in the FATA, Yemen, Somalia and else-
where. Any attempt by US Special Forces to capture these terrorists would be virtu-
ally impossible to undertake—and likely suicidal. Moreover, what human rights
advocates are suggesting is a retrospective approach to combating terrorism—
capture and prosecute the terrorists, hopefully before and not after another 9/11
attack occurs. Such an approach is wishful thinking, at best.
A prospective approach—preventing attacks before they are planned and suc-
cessfully executed—is necessary to protect the United States and its citizens against
the real and continuing threat from al-Qaeda and its supporters.99 There is simply
no obligation in domestic or international law to provide due process (e.g., judicial
review, offer to surrender, attempted capture, etc.) before using lethal force against
known enemy belligerents, including terrorists, who present an imminent and
continuing threat to the United States and its citizens. The Convention for the
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention)
recognizes that there is no “right to life” during armed conflict, by providing in
Article 15.2 that “deaths resulting from lawful acts of war” are outside the scope of
the Convention.100
Reliance on the ICJ advisory opinions to support the position that IHRL applies
to the targeting of al-Qaeda and other terrorists is also misplaced. The focus of the
Nuclear Weapons opinion was not on the targeting of combatants, but rather on the
catastrophic effects a nuclear weapon detonation would have on the civilian popu-
lation. The Court questioned whether the use of nuclear weapons could discrimi-
nate between the civilian population and combatants and civilian objects and
military objectives, indicating that the number of casualties that would ensue fol-
lowing the use of such a weapon would be enormous.101 UAS, with their enhanced
ISR and precision targeting capabilities, can easily distinguish between military
targets and protected people and places. Moreover, although there have been inci-
dental civilian deaths associated with the use of drones, the numbers (as discussed
below in the sections on proportionality and military necessity) are not excessive in
terms of the military advantage that has been achieved, and would certainly not fall
within the scope of casualties envisioned by the use of a nuclear weapon. Had the
Court been asked, “Does an enemy combatant or civilian directly participating in
hostilities have a ‘right to life’ during an armed conflict?” the Court would have
said no. It is also important to note that, other than the reference to human rights
in dicta in paragraphs 24 and 25, the Court applies IHL, not IHRL, in its analysis of
the issues (paragraphs 74–96). Nor does the Court cite any authority for its novel
declaration that IHRL applies during an armed conflict. Finally, in issuing its deci-
sions, the Court relies on IHL, not IHRL, stating:
D. Unanimously,
A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of
the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles
and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under
treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons;
E. By seven votes to seven, by the President’s casting vote,
It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;
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However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at
its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in
which the very survival of a State would be at stake.102
Similarly, the Wall advisory opinion focused on an occupation setting. It did not
address the issue of targeting enemy combatants or civilians directly participating
in hostilities. In fact, the Court recognizes in paragraph 106 that there are situa-
tions in which only IHL applies:
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights
law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of in-
ternational humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law;
yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law (emphasis
added).
Clearly, targeting of enemy combatants and civilians directly participating in hos-
tilities falls into the first category—exclusively matters of IHL. Additionally, as was
the case in the Nuclear Weapons opinion, the Court relies on IHL, not IHRL, in de-
ciding the case:
For these reasons,
The Court . . . [decided]
D. By [a vote of] thirteen votes to two, [that]
[a]ll States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from
the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situ-
ation created by such construction; all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in
addition the obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international
law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied
in that Convention.103
Finally, some opponents to the use of drones have suggested that the rules
should be different if the suspected terrorist is a US citizen. The fact that the in-
tended target of a drone strike is an American citizen, such as radical cleric Anwar
al-Awlaki who is hiding in Yemen, does not change the analysis. The citizenship of
the belligerent is irrelevant in the targeting decision. In an al-Qaeda video posted
on the Internet on May 23, 2010, al-Awlaki advocates the killing of American
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civilians in retaliation for the death of Iraqi and Afghan civilians killed by US
forces.104 Americans do not have a right to wage war against the United States. If
they do, they become lawful targets and may be engaged without “due process.”
The Supreme Court held in Ex parte Quirin that US citizenship did not bar the
prosecution of individuals as “enemies who have violated the law of war.”105 The
same logic would allow the direct engagement of a US citizen who has actively
sided with al-Qaeda.106
3. Does It Really Matter If IHRL Applies in an Armed Conflict?
Even if IHRL complemented IHL during periods of armed conflict, use of drones
to conduct strikes against terrorists outside the combat zone in self-defense would
not constitute a violation of IHRL. Although the ICJ indicated in the Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion that the right to life found in Article 6.1 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) applies in times of war, the
Court went on to explain that
[t]he test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined
by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life,
through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary depriva-
tion of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant can only be decided by reference to the
law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant
itself.107
Under IHL, enemy belligerents, like the al-Qaeda terrorists, who have not surren-
dered and are not hors de combat may be lawfully engaged at all times, subject only
to the principles of military necessity and proportionality. Such attacks would not
constitute an arbitrary deprivation of life under the ICCPR.108
It is also questionable whether the ICCPR would even apply to targeted killings
in Pakistan and other places outside the traditional combat zone. Article 2.1 pro-
vides that “[e]ach State Party . . . undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individ-
uals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant” (emphasis added). The ICJ similarly held in paragraph 111 of
the Wall advisory opinion that the ICCPR is only “applicable in respect of acts done
by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory” (e.g., in an oc-
cupation situation). The question of applicability of the Covenant therefore turns
on whether the terrorist being targeted “is within the jurisdiction, actual power, or
effective control of the state using the drone.”109 Al-Qaeda terrorists and their sup-
porters operating out of the FATA, Yemen or Somalia are not within the territorial
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jurisdiction of the United States nor are these individuals within the actual power
or control of the United States. In these circumstances, the ICCPR does not apply.
4. So What Are Human Rights Advocates Really After?
From the foregoing, it appears that there is nothing to gain by applying IHRL in an
armed conflict scenario. In fact, application of the IHRL “arbitrary deprivation of
life” standard would arguably provide far less protection than the IHL principles of
military necessity and proportionality. So what are human rights advocates really
trying to accomplish by arguing that IHRL applies in armed conflicts? The answer
is simple: change the outcomes governed by IHL by adding IHRL into the equa-
tion, thereby making IHL more restrictive and channeling the enforcement of IHL
through human rights mechanisms such as the Human Rights Council and re-
gional human rights courts. To quote a human rights advocate:
We wish to (boldly) take human rights to places, be they extraterritorial situations, or
those of armed conflict, where, as a matter of practical reality, no human rights have
gone before. . . . [A] purpose of the IHL/IHRL project is the enforcement of IHL
through human rights mechanisms. Thus, even if human rights substantively added
nothing to IHL, there would still be a point in regarding IHL and IHRL as two comple-
mentary bodies of law. IHL, now (jurisdictionally) framed in human rights terms,
could be enforced before political bodies, such as the Human Rights Council or UN
political organs more generally, or through judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms,
such as the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the
UN treaty bodies or domestic courts.110
The danger of allowing human rights mechanisms to review lawful military op-
erations, whether in a traditional armed conflict or in the war on terrorism, is illus-
trated by the absurd decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the
McCann case.111 The British government had information that three known IRA
terrorists were going to conduct a terrorist attack in Gibraltar by detonating a car
bomb by remote control. While several UK soldiers were following them, it ap-
peared that the terrorists were preparing for an attack. As one of the soldiers moved
forward to arrest the suspects, he observed one of the terrorists move his hand as if
he was about to press a button to detonate the bomb, and shot the suspect. A sec-
ond terrorist then appeared as if she was going to donate the bomb and was shot.
The third terrorist was also shot. A bomb was subsequently discovered in the car.
After hearing seventy-nine witnesses, a jury in the United Kingdom brought back a
verdict of lawful killing. Dissatisfied by that result, the decedents’ estates brought
the case to the European Court of Human Rights. Despite finding that “the soldiers
honestly believed . . . that it was necessary to shoot the suspects in order to prevent
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them from detonating a bomb and causing serious loss of life,” the Court neverthe-
less found by a vote of ten to nine that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the
European Convention because the UK authorities had not taken “appropriate care
in the control and organisation of the arrest operation.” Article 2.2 of the Conven-
tion provides that “deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contra-
vention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than
absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence . . . .”112
A second example of this dangerous approach is the continuing efforts by Philip
Alston, the current Special Rapporteur, to obtain information (much of which is
classified) on the use of UAS to target terrorists in the FATA and other areas out-
side Afghanistan and Iraq. In May 2010, Mr. Alston called on the United States to
stop using CIA operatives to conduct drone strikes against al-Qaeda terrorists.113
In a report delivered to the Human Right Council on May 28, Alston argues that
“intelligence agents do not generally operate within a framework which places ap-
propriate emphasis upon ensuring compliance with IHL, rendering violations
more likely.”114 Alston’s report also questions the validity of a portion of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC’s) Interpretive Guidance on the No-
tion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law that
allows for the targeting of civilians who are members of an armed group who have a
continuous combat function (CCF). According to the report, the “ICRC’s Guid-
ance raises concern from a human rights perspective” because the CCF category of
armed group members may be targeted anywhere, any time. The report concludes
that “the creation of CCF category is, de facto, a status determination that is ques-
tionable given the specific treaty language that limits direct participation to ‘for
such time’ as opposed to ‘all the time.’”115 The report therefore recommends, inter
alia, that “[t]he High Commissioner for Human Rights should convene a meeting
of States, including representatives of key military powers, the ICRC and human
rights and IHL experts to arrive at a broadly accepted definition of ‘direct partici-
pation in hostilities.’”116 It would appear from this report that Mr. Alston believes
that the Special Rapporteur and human rights organizations like the Human
Rights Council are more qualified than the ICRC and States parties to the Geneva
Conventions to decide IHL issues of this nature. I would suggest that determining
whether a civilian has directly participated in hostilities under the Geneva Conven-
tions and may therefore be targeted by belligerent forces is clearly outside the man-
date of the Special Rapporteur contained in Resolution 8/3 of the Human Rights
Council and further demonstrates the overreaching by human rights advocates
and organizations.117
In short, the United States has nothing to gain by acknowledging that IHRL ap-
plies alongside IHL in armed conflict situations, particularly in the targeting
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process. Human rights groups, whether non-governmental or governmental, are
generally biased against military operations conducted by any state and military
operations conducted by the United States, in particular. They (and their financial
supporters) generally oppose a strong military establishment, seek to level the play-
ing field between modern armed forces and insurgent groups/terrorists and en-
deavor to create a standard of zero collateral damage and incidental injury in war.
Any report or decision issued by these organizations would inevitably be critical of
US operations and would provide yet another source of information that can be ex-
ploited by our enemies.
IV. Host Nation Consent v. Self-Help in Self-Defense
Following setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has been able to reconstitute
and establish bases of operation in the FATA, which have served as a “staging area for
al-Qaeda attacks in Afghanistan,” as well as a base for its worldwide training opera-
tions.118 In fact, most of the high-priority terrorists, who continue to actively plot
against the United States, remain in hiding in some of the most remote, inaccessi-
ble parts of the world, including the FATA.119 To date, Pakistan has been unable or
unwilling to prevent cross-border attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan or
to disrupt terrorist planning and training efforts to conduct attacks against the
United States and its allies worldwide. That leaves the United States with two
options—wait for another terrorist attack or use UAS to conduct strikes against
these inaccessible targets.
A. Host Nation Consent
Opponents to the use of UAS to strike targets in nations outside the combat zone
argue that host nation consent is required for such attacks, “unless the state where
the group is present is responsible for their actions.”120 Although there is some evi-
dence that senior leadership within Pakistan tacitly consented to the drone strikes
by providing bases for UAS operations and targeting information to US forces and
the CIA, Pakistan has not officially consented to the attacks and has often publicly
protested the strikes as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.121
Accordingly, the opponents to the use of UAS argue that there is no legal basis for
the United States to attack terrorist targets in Pakistan or in any other nation out-
side of the combat zone.
B. Sovereignty v. Inherent Right of Self-Defense
The opponents’ position appears to be premised on the flawed assumption that
territorial integrity and State sovereignty are paramount in international law. The
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long-standing view of the United States on the issue of sovereignty, as articulated
by a former legal adviser to the US Department of State and a leading international
law scholar, is that “[t]erritorial integrity is not entitled to absolute deference in in-
ternational law, and our national defense requires that we claim the right to act
within the territory of other States in appropriate circumstances.”122 President
Obama reaffirmed this long-standing position in an address at West Point in 2009,
indicating that the United States “cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose
location is known, and whose intentions are clear.”123 The US position is supported
by Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter, which make clear that territorial integrity
and sovereignty give way to the right of self-defense.
C. Self-Help
It is equally well settled that States have an obligation under international law “to
control persons within their borders to ensure that they do not utilize their terri-
tory as a base for criminal activity.”124 Both domestic courts and international tri-
bunals have acknowledged this obligation. For instance, the US Supreme Court
held in 1887 that “[t]he law of nations requires every national government to use
‘due diligence’ to prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to another
nation with which it is at peace, or to the people thereof.”125 The ICJ has similarly
held that every State has an “obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”126
It is equally well settled that, if a nation is unwilling or unable to stop terrorists
or other armed groups from using its territory as a location from which to launch
attacks against another nation or its citizens, the aggrieved State has the right to
strike the terrorists or other armed groups within the territory of the host nation.127
The State Department Legal Adviser reiterated this right in his remarks at the ASIL
meeting:
[W]hether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend
upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of
the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of
those states to suppress the threat the target poses.128
Much of the FATA is inaccessible to Pakistani security forces. Additionally, the
Pakistani army has been reluctant to conduct offensive military operations against
militant groups in North Waziristan “because it does not want to antagonize
powerful insurgent groups there that have so far attacked only targets in
Afghanistan.”129 In short, Pakistan has been unable and unwilling to prevent use of
its territory by al-Qaeda and other militant groups that continue to plan and
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conduct terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies. Under these
circumstances, the United States has the inherent right under international law to
use force in self-defense against terrorist targets in Pakistan.
D. A History of Self-Help
Self-help is nothing new to the United States—our history is replete with examples
of the use of necessary and proportionate force in self-defense where a “neutral”
nation has been unable or unwilling to prevent the use of its territory as a staging
base for attacks. Some examples include:130
• 1814, 1816 and 1818 Seminole Indian attacks. The United States used force
in self-defense against attacks by Indians and former slaves emanating from Span-
ish Florida without the consent of Spain. The attacks were not directed at Spain
nor was the United States at war with Spain at the time.
• 1817 Amelia Island occupation. The United States used force in self-defense
to attack non-State actors (pirates, smugglers and privateers) on Amelia Island,
relying, in part, on “Spain’s inability to control misuse of its islands to prevent
armed attacks on U.S. territory and shipping . . . emanating from the islands.” At
the time, the United States was not at war with Spain and assured Spain that the
temporary occupation of Amelia Island was not a threat to its sovereignty. The US
military actions were taken without Spanish consent.
• 1837 Caroline incident. The Caroline case also provides an example of the
use of force in self-defense against non-State actors without the consent of the
host nation. The United Kingdom was not at war with the United States when it
attacked the Caroline in US waters to prevent future insurgent attacks emanating
from the United States into Canada. The attack was directed at the insurgents, not
the United States, and was not viewed as an act of war by the US government.
• 1854 Greytown bombardment. The US Navy bombarded the town of
Greytown, Nicaragua after the citizens of the town forcibly took possession of the
town, established their own government (not recognized by the United States),
and attacked a US diplomat and engaged in other acts of violence against US na-
tionals. In deciding whether the President had the power to order such an attack,
Justice Nelson of the US Supreme Court held that the President had the authority
to use force “as part of a power of protection of US nationals abroad against acts of
lawless violence and an irresponsible and marauding community.” The bombard-
ment was conducted without the consent of Nicaragua.
• 1916 Pancho Villa raids. In 1916, President Wilson authorized US forces to
attack Pancho Villa’s forces in Mexico after they had crossed into the United
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States and attacked towns in Texas and New Mexico. A second incursion was au-
thorized later that year when Mexican bandits attacked Glen Springs, Texas.
• 1998 cruise-missile strikes. President Clinton authorized cruise-missile
strikes against al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan without the consent of the
Taliban government after al-Qaeda bombed the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The terrorist attacks killed more than 250 persons and
injured over 5,500. The strikes were justified as self-defense in response to prior
armed attacks and to prevent future attacks against the United States by al-Qaeda.
As these examples illustrate, while a nation’s sovereignty is an important factor
that must be taken into consideration before conducting a cross-border strike, it
does not take precedence over a right of self-defense where that nation has been
unable or unwilling to prevent the use of its territory as a base of operations for
attacks. Article 51 of the Charter also makes clear that sovereignty and territorial
integrity give way to this inherent right of self-defense against an armed attack or
imminent threat of armed attack. Pakistan has been unable (due to inaccessible
terrain) or unwilling (due to political considerations) to prevent militant groups
from using the FATA to plan and attack the United States and its allies. Under these
circumstances, the United States is legally justified in using force in self-defense,
including UAS strikes, to prevent future attacks from Pakistani territory.
V. Do Drone Strikes Violate Traditional Principles of IHL/LOAC?
Basic principles of IHL affect all phases of the targeting cycle. This is particularly
true during the target development, validation, nomination and prioritization
phase, as well as the mission planning and force execution phases. However, IHL
recognizes that military forces cannot engage in hostilities without some degree of
incidental injury to protected persons and collateral damage to protected objects.
The key is the determination of how to minimize incidental injury to civilians and
collateral damage to civilian objects consistent with mission accomplishment and
the law.
As a general rule, “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy
is not unlimited.”131 Additionally, “[t]he civilian population as such, as well as indi-
vidual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”132 In this regard, when conduct-
ing military operations, commanders must
• do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians
nor civilian objects . . . but are military objectives . . . ;
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• take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view
to avoiding, and in any event minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil-
ians and damage to civilian objects; [and]
• refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause inciden-
tal loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects . . . which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.133
Commanders must also be prepared to cancel or suspend an attack
if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special pro-
tection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, or damage to civilian objects . . . which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.134
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that incidental injury of civilians and collateral
damage to civilian objects is not prohibited by IHL; what is prohibited is excessive
injury or damage in relation to the military advantage expected to be gained by the
use of force. In other words, the wanton destruction of life and property as an end
in itself violates IHL, but the law does not prohibit the use of force, even over-
whelming force, by a military commander to compel the complete submission of
the enemy in order to protect the safety of his force and facilitate the success of his
mission.135 Therefore, attacks by UAS that unintentionally cause incidental
injury to civilians or damage to civilian property, in addition to killing the intended
targets, e.g., an insurgent leader, are fully consistent with IHL to the extent the in-
jury or damage is not excessive when compared to the military advantage gained by
the attacks.
Compliance with IHL is much more complex in the current conflict with al-
Qaeda because insurgent forces routinely commingle with the civilian population
and operate from protected places. It becomes exceedingly more difficult to mini-
mize incidental injury and collateral damage in such situations because of the diffi-
culties encountered in distinguishing combatants from civilians and military
objects from civilian objects. Under these circumstances, al-Qaeda and its support-
ers must be held primarily responsible for any collateral damage and incidental in-
jury in such cases because they have failed to comply with their obligation to “avoid
locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas.”136 Addition-
ally, one must consider whether the civilians are deliberately acting as voluntary
human shields for the insurgent forces, in which case, they may be considered to be
directly participating in hostilities and therefore subject to attack.137
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A. Military Necessity
The purpose of IHL is to ensure that hostilities are directed toward the enemy and
not used to cause unnecessary human suffering and physical destruction. The
principle of military necessity limits suffering and destruction to that which is nec-
essary to achieve a valid military objective. When applying this principle, the com-
mander should ask whether the object of attack is a valid military objective and, if
so, whether the total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization of the object
will constitute a definite military advantage under the circumstances existing at the
time of the attack. This does not mean, however, that overwhelming force cannot
be used to destroy a valid military objective if consistent with the principles of dis-
tinction and proportionality discussed below.138
Opponents to the use of UAS to conduct strikes outside the traditional combat
zone argue that drone attacks violate the principle of military necessity because
they fuel anti-Americanism in the FATA and do little to weaken the al-Qaeda orga-
nization.139 Opponents argue that killing innocent civilians invites retaliation and
aids al-Qaeda recruitment efforts in the FATA and elsewhere by antagonizing the
local population, alienating surviving family members and creating martyrs.140
The opponents point to statements by some Pakistani military officers who have
confirmed that drone strikes motivate local tribesmen in the FATA to fight against
the Pakistani government because the attacks are viewed as a breach of Pakistan’s
sovereignty.141 It is therefore argued that, if the military objective of defeating al-
Qaeda cannot be achieved because drone strikes do not weaken the terrorist orga-
nization as intended, but rather have had unforeseen consequences of fueling anti-
American sentiments and assisting al-Qaeda’s recruitment efforts, the attacks vio-
late the principle of military necessity.142
These arguments, which are not supported by independent studies, are based on
exaggerated civilian casualty figures. They also fail to acknowledge that, in the past
two years alone, UAS strikes have killed over 500 militants, including 39 top-tier
and mid-to-high-level leaders, thereby disrupting al-Qaeda’s ability to operate
with impunity from the FATA.143 An independent study by the New America
Foundation puts the number of militants killed at between 618 and 966.144 More
important, since December 2009, the terrorist organization has been dealt a num-
ber of serious blows by successful drone attacks against several high-ranking al-
Qaeda officials. In December, Saleh al-Somali, a senior planner responsible for al-
Qaeda operations outside Afghanistan and Pakistan, was killed by a drone strike in
northern Waziristan.145 Al-Qaeda operations were dealt further crippling blows in
April 2010 and May 2010 with the deaths of the two top al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq,
Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, and the death of the number-three
official in the organization and overall commander for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan,
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Mustafa Abu al-Yazid.146 Equally important, drone strikes have effectively im-
paired al-Qaeda operations by creating an “atmosphere of fear and distrust among
members” of the organization, with reports indicating that militant leaders sleep
outside of their homes for fear of being targeted by a drone and suspected spies are
routinely executed for providing information to the United States.147
Independent studies by the New America Foundation and the Aryana Institute
for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA), as well as Reuters reporting, also
do not support the allegations that civilian casualties in the FATA are fueling
anti-American sentiments and assisting al-Qaeda recruiting efforts. First, despite
claims to the contrary, there have been no major public protests in the FATA
against the use of drones. Moreover, the number of civilian casualties in the
FATA is much lower than the numbers claimed by militant groups and opponents
to the use of drones in Pakistan. The New America Foundation study shows that
the 131 reported drone strikes in the FATA since 2004 “have killed approximately
between 908 to 1,347 individuals, of whom around 618 to 966 were described as
militants in reliable press accounts”; thus less than 30 percent of the total casual-
ties were civilians.148
The AIRRA study also concluded that anti-Americanism in the FATA has not
increased significantly due to US drone attacks.149 Between November 2009 and
January 2010, AIRRA sent five teams of five researchers each to conduct a public
opinion survey about UAS attacks in areas of the FATA most often targeted by US
drones. The following are the questions posed by the survey teams and the re-
sponses of the people of the FATA:
• Do you see drone attacks bringing about fear and terror in the common people? (Yes
45%, No 55%)
• Do you think the drones are accurate in their strikes? (Yes 52%, No 48%)
• Do you think anti-American feelings in the area increased due to drone attacks re-
cently? (Yes 42%, No 58%)
• Should Pakistan military carry out targeted strikes at the militant organisations?
(Yes 70%, No 30%)
• Do the militant organisations get damaged due to drone attacks? (Yes 60%, No
40%)
Local residents were also asked questions concerning sovereignty and civilian
casualties. Regarding territorial integrity, people were asked if US drone attacks on
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the FATA were viewed by the local population as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty.
More than two-thirds said they were not. “Pakistan’s sovereignty, they argued, was
insulted and annihilated by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, whose territory FATA is af-
ter Pakistan lost it to them. The US is violating the sovereignty of the Taliban and
Al-Qaeda, not of Pakistan.”150 Moreover, more than two-thirds of the people inter-
viewed consider “Al-Qaeda and the Taliban as enemy number one” and a large
majority (nearly two-thirds) want the United States “to continue the drone attacks
because the Pakistani army is unable or unwilling to retake the territory from the
Taliban.”151 Although there was some concern over civilian casualties and collateral
damage, most of the people interviewed indicated that most of the drone attacks
hit their intended targets. In fact, they indicated that most of the collateral damage
is to houses rented to the militants. Additionally, local residents indicated that the
Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists normally seal off the area after a drone attack in
order to remove everything, including militant casualties, from the site before al-
lowing locals to return to their homes. As a result, an accurate battle damage assess-
ment is not possible. In short, the AIRRA study contradicts the assertion of the
impact of civilian casualties on anti-Americanism and “the mantra of violation of
the sovereignty of Pakistan perpetuated by the armchair analysts in the media.”152
The results of the AIRRA study were subsequently confirmed by a Reuters spe-
cial report. In a May 2010 interview, a tribal elder from the FATA told a Reuters re-
porter that the residents of northern Waziristan “want to get rid of the Taliban and
if the Pakistani army cannot do it now, then . . . drone attacks . . . [are] fine with
them.”153 He further indicated that “[t]here is no anger against the strikes as long as
civilians are safe” and that “[t]here have been civilian deaths but not in big num-
bers.”154 A second tribal leader indicated: “We prefer drone strikes than army oper-
ations because in such operations, we also suffer. But drones hit militants and it is
good for us.”155 Based on these independent reports and surveys, allegations that
drone strikes violate the principle of military necessity are clearly misplaced.
B. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is concerned with weighing the military advantage
one expects to gain by an attack against the unavoidable and incidental harm to civil-
ians and damage to civilian property that will result from the attack. This principle
requires the commander to determine whether incidental injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects that may result from the attack will be excessive in rela-
tion to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.156
Opponents to the use of drones outside the traditional combat zone also argue
that killing a large number of civilians in an attempt to kill one terrorist leader vio-
lates the principle of proportionality.157 This argument is based on alleged civilian
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casualty rates of fifty innocent civilians killed to each militant targeted—“[a]t a ra-
tio of 50 to 1, the disproportionate impact of drone attacks in Pakistan represents a
serious violation of the traditional rules of war.”158
The opponents’ position that UAS cause unnecessary and disproportionate
harm to the civilian population is flawed for a number of reasons. First, as indi-
cated above, the number of actual civilians killed by UAS strikes in Pakistan is sig-
nificantly lower than the numbers reported by the opponents to the use of drones.
The New America Foundation study shows innocent civilian casualties caused by
drone strikes at around 30 percent.159 These figures have been confirmed by a se-
nior Pakistani military officer who indicated that “he believed that a third of the
dead were militants, a third sympathizers and a third innocent civilians.”160 And
some US and Pakistani intelligence estimates put the number of non-combatant
civilian casualties—primarily family members who live and travel with targeted
militants—as low as 5 and 20 percent, respectively.161 Second, the opponents’ ar-
gument incorrectly assumes that the principle of proportionality requires a com-
parison between the number of innocent civilians killed or wounded and the
number of terrorists killed or wounded. Rather, what the proportionality principle
actually requires is a balancing of incidental injury to civilians and collateral dam-
age to civilian property against the military advantage expected to be gained by the
attack, as determined by the military commander—not by the ICRC, Human Right
Council, Human Rights Watch or the Special Rapporteur. The commander’s deci-
sion is based on validated, real-time, reliable intelligence; target evaluation in light
of the campaign plan (e.g., top-tier, high-level, mid-level leader or low-level opera-
tive); presence of civilians at the target and their statuses (e.g., voluntary or invol-
untary human shields, women and children); location of the target (e.g., protected
place, civilian object, safe house, terrorist training camp); and his or her experience
as a commander. Each target is carefully scrutinized and analyzed through a com-
plex targeting approval process which considers all of these factors in light of the
most recent real-time intelligence.
C. Distinction
The principle of distinction is concerned with distinguishing combatants from
civilians and military objects from civilian objects so as to minimize harm to civil-
ians and damage to civilian property.162 To achieve this result, military command-
ers have a duty to distinguish their forces from the civilian population (e.g.,
through the wearing of uniforms or other distinctive signs) and distinguish valid
military objectives from civilians or civilian objects before attacking.163
Opponents of the use of drones argue that, even if a US drone operator is
reasonably certain that the intended target is a valid military objective (e.g., an
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al-Qaeda terrorist), he or she is still obligated to minimize civilian injuries.
Because suspected terrorists wear civilian clothes and commingle with the local
population, they cannot be clearly distinguished from the innocent civilians, even
by high-tech drones. Citing Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I (AP I), which
provides that “in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be
considered to be a civilian,” opponents to the use of drones argue that if there is
any uncertainty as to whether or not a person is a suspected militant (because he
is wearing civilian clothes or has commingled with the civilian population, etc.),
IHL presumes that the person is a protected civilian.164
Such a position rewards terrorists for violating the very laws that opponents to
the use of drones seek to use to protect them from attack. Moreover, it encourages
further violations by the militants, thereby increasing the danger to the civilian
population. It also ignores the enhanced precision and restraint drones bring to the
targeting process as compared to a pilot with limited information in the cockpit or
the commander of a long-range artillery battery.165 Improved ISR capabilities,
“lack of fear-induced haste, reduced anger levels” and clearer battle damage assess-
ments all combine to enhance awareness of protected persons and objects in the
target area and restraint on the part of drone operators to engage such persons or
objects.166 More important, the opponents’ position ignores basic rules of IHL that
prohibit belligerents from using protected persons and protected objects to render
certain areas, objects or belligerent forces immune from attack.167 In this regard,
Article 51(7) of AP I provides that “[t]he Parties to the conflict shall not direct the
movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to
shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.” Article
58(b) additionally provides that “[t]he Parties to the conflict shall, to the maxi-
mum extent feasible[,] . . . avoid locating military objectives within or near densely
populated areas.” Militants violate these principles on a daily basis by commin-
gling with the civilian population and enlisting the voluntary and involuntary aid
of human shields to enhance their operations and mobilize public opinion against
the United States when UAS strikes cause incidental injury or collateral damage.
They store their ammunition in mosques, place weapons on top of schools and
hospitals, use ambulances to deliver suicide bombs and set up command and con-
trol centers in private homes, and then exploit the resulting injury or damage when
these protected places or objects are attacked.168
Even though UAS are among the most precise weapons in the US inventory to-
day, incidental injury to innocent civilians and collateral damage to civilian prop-
erty is inevitable, particularly in light of the manner in which terrorists fight and
operate. The State Department Legal Adviser highlighted this fact in his remarks:
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[T]his is a conflict with an organized terrorist enemy that does not have conventional
forces, but that plans and executes its attacks against us and our allies while hiding
among civilian populations. That behavior . . . makes the application of international
law more difficult and more critical for the protection of innocent civilians.169
Although these repeated IHL violations do not relieve the United States of its obli-
gation under the law to take all feasible precautions to minimize incidental loss of
civilian life and damage to civilian objects, the terrorists’ actions must be taken into
consideration when determining the legality and proportionality of an attack
against militants who have taken refuge in the civilian population and engaged in
hostilities from protected places.170
D. US Adherence to IHL in the Targeting Process
The Obama administration (as well as the previous administration) has continued
to adhere to basic principles of IHL when targeting al-Qaeda terrorists outside the
traditional combat zone. Koh emphasized that administration officials have
carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these opera-
tions are conducted consistently with law of war principles, including: . . . the principle
of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civil-
ians and civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack; and . . . the principle of pro-
portionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated. In U.S. operations against al-Qaeda and its associated forces—including lethal
operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles—great care is taken to
adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legiti-
mate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum.171
In short, drone attacks are being conducted in accordance with US obligations un-
der IHL.
VI. Use of Civilian UAS Operators to Target Terrorists
Today, more than ever, civilian contractors are increasingly being utilized to sup-
port combat forces across the entire spectrum of military operations, to include in-
telligence, planning, technical support, logistics and communications support
functions. Civilian contractors play critical roles as analysts, trainers, computer
programmers and maintenance technicians for high-tech unmanned systems. The
1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Third Geneva Convention both recognize
that civilians will support and accompany the armed forces in times of armed
251
Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo
Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:26 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
conflict.172 AP I, Article 50 further recognizes that these individuals, notwithstand-
ing their affiliation with the armed forces, are still considered to be “civilians” for
purposes of targeting and Article 51 specifies that civilians “shall not be the object
of attack.”173 Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention similarly provides that
“protected persons . . . shall at all times be . . . protected . . . against all acts of vio-
lence.”174 Therefore, although the nature of their duties, and/or proximity to or
presence in the combat zone, may increase the risk that these civilian contractors
may be incidentally injured or killed, as long as they do not directly participate in
hostilities, they are not subject to direct attack.
Civilians lose their protected status if they directly participate in the hostilities.
AP I, Article 51 provides that “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by
this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” (emphasis
added). Similarly, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides
that “persons taking no active part in the hostilities . . . shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely” (emphasis added). Consequently, civilian contractors or
CIA operatives who conduct drone strikes against military objectives would be
considered to be directly participating in hostilities and could be lawfully targeted
by the enemy.
A. Inherently Governmental Functions
DoD avoids this issue by prohibiting its civilian personnel and contractors from
engaging in functions that are inherently governmental, including combat opera-
tions.175 Pursuant to DoD guidelines, civilians are prohibited from participating in
combat operations if the planned use of disruptive and/or destructive combat ca-
pabilities is an inherent part of the mission.176 Combat operations include actively
seeking out, closing with and destroying enemy forces, including employment of
firepower and other destructive and disruptive capabilities on the battlefield.177
Consistent with this guidance, only US military personnel may operate US weap-
ons systems against the enemy.
B. Direct Participation in Hostilities
Opponents to the use of UAS to conduct strikes outside the traditional combat
zone argue that CIA operatives and civilian contractors conducting such strikes are
unlawful combatants and may not participate in hostilities.178 This position is con-
trary to the majority view expressed by most law of war scholars, who hold that it is
not a war crime for civilians to participate in hostilities, but if they do, they are not
entitled to combatant immunity under domestic law for their belligerent acts.179
Even the Special Rapporteur (Philip Alston) would agree that under IHL “civilians
. . . are not prohibited from participating in hostilities.”180 In his report filed with
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the Human Rights Council in late May, Alston indicates that direct participation in
hostilities is not a war crime, but that there are consequences that flow from such
participation.
First, because they are directly participating in hostilities by conducting targeted
killings, intelligence personnel may themselves be targeted and killed. Second, in-
telligence personnel do not have immunity from prosecution under domestic law
for their conduct. Thus CIA personnel could be prosecuted for murder under the
domestic law of any country in which they conduct targeted drone killings, and
could also be prosecuted for violations of applicable US law.181
The aforementioned discussion assumes, of course, that the United States is en-
gaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. If the opponents to the
use of drones are correct in arguing that the United States is not at war with al-
Qaeda, then civilian operators would not be considered “unlawful combatants”
and their actions could be legally justified as a “lawful exercise of the customary
sovereign right of self-defense against a non-state actor.”182
VII. Targeting Terrorists Who Directly Participate in Hostilities
Questions concerning who may be targeted by a UAS strike have also been raised
by opponents to the use of drones. These questions center on what activity consti-
tutes direct participation in hostilities (DPH) and how long individuals who have
directly participated in hostilities may be targeted. In his May 2010 report, Philip
Alston indicates that
regardless of the enemy’s tactics, in order to protect the vast majority of civilians, direct
participation may only include conduct close to that of a fighter, or conduct that
directly supports combat. More attenuated acts, such as providing financial support,
advocacy, or other non-combat aid, does [sic] not constitute direct participation. . . .
Thus, although illegal activities, e.g., terrorism, may cause harm, if they do not meet the
criteria for direct participation in hostilities, then States’ response must conform to
the lethal force standards applicable to self-defence and law enforcement.183
Other critics have similarly argued that IHL “supports decisions in favor of sparing
life and avoiding destruction in close cases.”184
Neither the Geneva Conventions nor the Additional Protocols define DPH. In
an effort to fill this gap, the ICRC issued the non-binding Interpretive Guidance on
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian
Law.185 In essence, the ICRC guidelines address three questions:
• Who is considered a civilian for the purposes of the principle of distinction?
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• What conduct amounts to direct participation in hostilities?
• What modalities govern the loss of protection against direct attack?
A. Who Is a Civilian?
The ICRC takes the position that, in an international armed conflict, “all persons
who are neither members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict nor
participants in a levée en masse are civilians and . . . entitled to protection against
direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”186 For
a non-international armed conflict, the ICRC maintains that
all persons who are not members of State armed forces or organized armed groups of a
party to the conflict [i.e., armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict who continu-
ously take a direct part in hostilities (continuous combat function)] are civilians and . . .
entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities.187
B. What Constitutes DPH?
An act must meet the following criteria in order to constitute DPH under the Inter-
pretive Guidance:188
• Threshold of Harm. An act likely to adversely affect the military operations
or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or to inflict death, injury or de-
struction on protected persons or objects.
• Direct Causation. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the
harm likely to result from that act or from a coordinated military operation of
which that act constitutes an integral part.
• Belligerent Nexus. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the
required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detri-
ment of another.
C. Loss of Protected Status
The third question, concerning belligerent nexus, addresses a number of issues, in-
cluding the length of the period during which civilians lose their protected status if
they directly participate in hostilities. According to the Interpretive Guidance, civil-
ians lose their protection against direct attack only for the “duration of each spe-
cific act amounting to [DPH],” which includes measures preparatory to the
execution of the act, “as well as the deployment to and the return from the location
of its execution.”189 When civilians cease to directly participate in hostilities, they
regain their status as civilians and are protected against direct attack (the so-called
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“revolving door” of civilian protection). The only exception to this rule is that
civilians who assume a CCF as members of an organized armed group belonging to
a non-State party to the conflict lose their protected status for as long as they re-
main members of the group.
D. Problems with the ICRC Approach
The ICRC guidelines concerning the “revolving door” of civilian protection and
the application of the CCF are problematic, at best, and appear to be biased against
modern military forces, particularly when applied in the UAS context. To illus-
trate: under the “revolving door” of civilian protection, if an Afghan baker leaves
his shop with an improvised explosive device (IED), places it on the side of the
road, detonates it when a convoy drives by, killing five coalition soldiers, then
safely returns to his home without being detected, the baker can no longer be di-
rectly targeted, because he has regained his protected status as a civilian (assuming
of course that he has not assumed a CCF). This “baker by day, terrorist by night”
can be apprehended and prosecuted for his criminal acts, but he is no longer con-
sidered to be directly participating in hostilities and is not subject to direct attack.
Application of the ICRC guidelines to individuals involved in the use of IEDs
against coalition forces also produces anomalous results. The ICRC maintains that
a person who purchases and smuggles components for an IED and the person who
assembles and stores the IED in a workshop do not cause direct harm and are,
therefore, not directly participating in hostilities and may not be directly targeted.
According to the ICRC, only the person planting or detonating the IED meets the
requirement of direct causation for the purposes of direct participation in hostili-
ties. Purchasing, smuggling, assembling and storing an IED that is later used in an
attack against coalition forces are not considered by the ICRC to be “integral parts
of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation.”
Compare the ICRC’s “integral part” analysis to the use of drones. The ICRC
considers all the following individuals to be directly participating in hostilities and
therefore subject to direct attack:
• the individual who loads the missile on a drone that is used to conduct a
strike against terrorist targets;
• the individual who launches (or recovers) the UAS, even though control of
the drone is transferred to uniformed combat forces when it arrives on station;
• the computer specialist who operates the UAS through remote control;
• the operator collecting intelligence data;
• the individual illuminating the target;
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• the specialist controlling the firing of the missile;
• the radio operator transmitting orders to fire the missile; and
• the overall mission commander.
While acknowledging that only a few of these individuals carry out activities that,
in isolation, could be said to directly cause the required threshold of harm, the
ICRC interprets the standard of direct causation more broadly in the UAS context
to include conduct that causes harm in conjunction with other acts. In other
words, even if a specific act does not on its own directly cause the required thresh-
old of harm, “the requirement of direct causation would still be fulfilled where the
act constitutes an integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that
directly causes such harm.”190
It is clear from these examples that the Interpretive Guidance guidelines are in-
ternally inconsistent and provide greater protection for terrorists and insurgents
than they do for civilians and civilian contractors accompanying the force. It is in-
conceivable that the ICRC does not consider the purchasing, smuggling of com-
ponents, assembling or storing of an IED that is later used in an attack on coalition
forces to be an “integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation,”
thereby fulfilling the requirement of direct causation/harm. Yet, the ICRC would
say that a contractor loading a missile on a UAS that is later dropped on a terrorist
target is directly participating in hostilities because the act of loading the missile is
an integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that directly
causes harm to the enemy. Such a conclusion is absurd and completely ignores the
fact that IED attacks “are the No. 1 killer of US troops in Afghanistan” and “more
than half of American combat deaths [in 2008] were the result of IED” attacks.191
The ICRC is supposed to act as a neutral and independent humanitarian organi-
zation to protect innocent civilians and promote and work for a better understand-
ing of IHL; its job is not to level the playing field between opposing belligerents.
Unfortunately, in the case of DPH the ICRC has lost its impartiality by attempting
to penalize the use of civilian contractors and high-tech unmanned systems, while
at the same time providing additional protection to supporters of terrorist groups
like al-Qaeda.
E. The Israeli Approach
The Israeli Supreme Court has taken a different, yet similar, approach to DPH. In
the Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel decision, the
Court determined that a civilian is considered to have taken part in hostilities when
• using weapons in an armed conflict, while gathering intelligence or while
preparing himself/herself for the hostilities;
256
Use of Unmanned Systems to Combat Terrorism
Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:27 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
• acting as a voluntary human shield;
• sending a person to commit a hostile act, directing the hostile act and plan-
ning a hostile act; or
• joining a terrorist organization and committing a chain of hostilities, with
short periods of rest between them.192
The Court additionally determined that lethal force could only be used against a
civilian that is considered to have taken a direct part in hostilities if the following
criteria were satisfied:193
• well-based information is needed before categorizing a civilian as directly
participating in hostilities;
• a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked if a less harmful
means can be employed (e.g., arrest) unless such means involve a risk so great to
the lives of the soldiers that they are not required or harm to nearby innocent civil-
ians might be greater than that caused by refraining from using lesser means; and
• after an attack on a civilian suspected of taking an active part in hostilities, a
thorough, independent investigation regarding the precision of the identification
of the target and the circumstances of the attack upon him is to be performed.
Although not a perfect solution, the Israeli approach is more realistic and offers
sufficient safeguards to ensure protection of innocent civilians in the targeting
decision.
VIII. Use of Advanced Weapons Systems
A final argument, which merits little attention, has been advanced by some oppo-
nents to the use of drones. In general, they argue that the use of advanced weapons
systems in lethal operations against terrorists is illegal under international law. In
response to this argument the State Department Legal Adviser correctly noted that
“the rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon system used, and
there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically ad-
vanced weapons systems in armed conflict . . . so long as they are employed in con-
formity with applicable laws of war.”194 In this regard, DoD regulations require
that all acquisition and procurement of DoD weapons and weapon systems be con-
sistent with all applicable domestic law, treaties and international agreements, cus-
tomary international law and the law of armed conflict. To ensure compliance with
international law and US treaty obligations, all intended acquisitions of weapons
and weapons systems are subject to a legal review by a DoD attorney authorized to
conduct such reviews.195 Drones have been determined to be consistent with all US
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treaty obligations and international law. A similar requirement applies to non-lethal
weapons. Each military service is required to conduct a legal review of the acquisi-
tion of all non-lethal weapons to ensure consistency with US treaty obligations,
customary international law and, in particular, the laws of war.196
IX. Conclusion
The position being advocated by human rights advocates and the opponents to the
use of drones is a position of weakness that, if adopted by the Obama administra-
tion, will provide al-Qaeda and its affiliates with a substantial advantage in their
war of aggression against the United States and its allies. J. Cofer Black, the State
Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, got it right when he testified be-
fore the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and
Human Rights in 2004:
No country is safe from the scourge of terrorism. No country is immune from attack,
and neither policies of deterrence nor accommodation will ward off attack. Al-Qaeda
seeks only death and chaos, which is why we will continue to pursue the only viable
course of action before us, which is to destroy this enemy utterly, both with the cooper-
ation of our allies and by unilateral action when necessary. . . . This is definitely a long-
term fight. This is a war. . . . [W]hile we have made substantial progress toward eradi-
cating the threat posed by al-Qaeda, we are on a long, tough road. We cannot afford to
falter . . . . [I]n counterterrorism . . . weakness is exploited, and it must not be shown.197
Mr. Black’s testimony is equally applicable today. The United States must continue
to attack al-Qaeda and its affiliates wherever they may be found in order to achieve
victory in this protracted war. In the short term, the use of UAS appears to be the
best (if not the only) viable option to target terrorists operating from the remote
areas of the FATA, Yemen, Somalia and other places. As Harold Koh emphasized,
al-Qaeda continues to pose an imminent threat to the United States and the terror-
ist organization
has not abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed continues to attack
us. . . . [Accordingly,] the United States has the authority under international law, and
the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself,
including by targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning
attacks.198
If you’ve seen the movie Patton you will recall General Patton’s address to the
Third Army on the eve of the D-Day invasion in 1944, which begins with his
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famous quip: “I want you to remember that no bastard ever won a war by dying for
his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his coun-
try.”199 Opponents to the use of drones argue that US forces must first warn or at-
tempt to capture suspected terrorists before they are engaged with lethal force,
even if the terrorists are operating out of remote and inaccessible areas like the
FATA. This “capture first” mentality violates the first tenet of Patton’s clever re-
mark by turning a blind eye to reality—such a limitation on the use of force in an
armed conflict will provide greater protection for suspected terrorists and will in-
evitably result in large numbers of US casualties. Fortunately, Presidents Bush and
Obama chose the Patton alternative—providing al-Qaeda terrorists the opportu-
nity to die for their cause. Accordingly the United States will continue to use UAS
to attack enemy belligerents, including al-Qaeda operatives, consistent with the in-
herent right of self-defense and the laws of war.
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